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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Chester County Magistrate Angel Catina 
Underwood, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001420 
Opinion No. 27665 
Submitted August 23, 2016 – Filed September 14, 2016 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph P. 
Turner, Jr., Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Stanley Lamont Myers, Sr., Esquire, of Moore Taylor 
Law Firm, P.A., of West Columbia, for respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this judicial disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for 
Discipline by Consent pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Judicial 
Disciplinary Enforcement (RJDE) contained in Rule 502 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  In the agreement, respondent 
admits misconduct and consents to the imposition of any discipline up to a 
one year suspension from judicial duties.  She requests that any suspension be 
imposed retroactively to May 8, 2015, the date of her interim suspension.  
We accept the agreement and impose a public reprimand.  The facts as set 
forth in the agreement are as follows. 
12 

  
 
 
 
Facts 

On May 18, 2011, respondent was appointed a magistrate.  At the time, 
respondent's husband had retired from the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division and he did not hold any political offices.  Respondent's husband later ran 
for and was elected Sheriff of Chester County.   
South Carolina Court Administration forwarded a spreadsheet to ODC which 
indicated that, between July 1, 2013, and sometime in April of 2015, respondent's
"judge code" was entered as having handled numerous traffic citations, arrest 
warrants, and bond hearings in Chester County Sheriff's Department cases.  A total 
of 101 cases were identified with respondent's "judge code."  In response to this 
information, Court Administration went to the Chester County Magistrate's Office 
and obtained a sampling of cases which corroborated respondent's involvement in 
cases involving the Chester County Sheriff's Department.   
In mitigation, respondent states she attempted to follow the remittal of 
disqualification process on many of the matters, but now recognizes she did so 
incorrectly after having reviewed Section 3F of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR, with ODC.  Respondent asserts she thought that she 
was complying with the remittal requirements by announcing her conflict before 
court and proceeding when no objections were voiced.  She now recognizes that 
remittal requires that the disclosure be made on the record to each defendant, that 
each defendant be given time to consider the matter with counsel, and that the 
defendant's decision on the matter be placed on the record.    
Respondent also incorrectly believed that when defendants requested she take their 
plea and/or knew her connection with the Sheriff's Department that the conflict 
was waived and she could take the plea.  Respondent now recognizes that in these 
situations she was required to comply with the requirements of Section 3F of 
Canon 3. Respondent submits that she will comply with Section 3F at all times in 
the future. 
In one instance, respondent mistakenly conducted a jury trial thinking that she 
could preside over the trial since the jury would decide the matter.  Respondent 
now recognizes she must comply with Section 3F of Canon 3 in all jury trials.   
13 

  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
In mitigation, respondent offers that no parties complained about the bonds that she 
set or the disposition of matters in question.  ODC confirms it has received no 
complaints from the defendants in question.   
Respondent now asserts she understands the requirements of Section 3F of Canon 
3 and submits that she will fully comply with the requirements of Section 3F of 
Canon 3 in all matters in the future. 
Law 
Respondent admits that by her conduct she has violated the following provisions of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR:  Section 2E of Canon 3 (judge 
shall disqualify herself in proceeding in which judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned) and Section 3F of Canon 3 (judge disqualified by terms 
of Section 3E may disclose on record basis of judge's disqualification and may ask 
parties and their lawyers to consider, out of presence of judge, whether to waive 
disqualification. If following disclosure of basis for disqualification, parties and 
lawyers, without participation by judge, agree that judge should not be disqualified 
and judge is then willing to participate, judge may participate in the proceeding; 
agreement shall be incorporated in record of proceeding). 
Respondent also admits that her misconduct constitutes grounds for discipline 
pursuant to the following Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 502, 
SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for discipline for judge to violated Code 
of Judicial Conduct).   
Conclusion 
We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  Accordingly, we 
accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for her misconduct.1 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
1 Respondent's interim suspension is lifted.   
14 

  
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Kristin Joseph, P.T., Thomas N. Joseph, M.D., and 
William G. McCarthy, M.D., Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation, South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy, 
Respondents, 
 
and 
 
South Carolina Chapter, American Physical Therapy 
Association, Joseph M. McKowen, PT, Sabrina Queen 
Bridges, PTA, and Amalia W. Kirby, PTA, Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001115 
Appeal From Richland County 

The Honorable G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court
	
Judge 

Opinion No. 27666 

Heard February 19, 2015 – Filed September 14, 2016 

REVERSED 

M. Elizabeth Crum, of McNair Law Firm, P.A., of 
Columbia, for Appellants.  Monteith P. Todd, of Sowell 
Gray Stepp & Laffitte, L.L.C., of Columbia, S. Jahue 
Moore and John C. Bradley, Jr., both of Moore Taylor 
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Law Firm, of West Columbia, N. Thomas Connally, III, 
of Hogan Lovells US LLP, of McLean, Virginia and John 
R. Devlin, Jr., of Devlin & Parkinson, P.A., of 
Greenville, for Respondents.
ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: This is the latest in a longstanding disagreement 
regarding how the practice of physical therapy should be regulated in South 
Carolina. The South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy (the Board) has sided 
with members of the profession who desire to prevent physical therapists (PTs) 
from providing treatment as direct employees of physicians.  The Board has long 
sought to require PTs to provide their services directly to patients or through a 
practice group of PTs.  However, other licensed healthcare professionals in South 
Carolina, such as occupational therapists, speech pathologists, and nurse 
practitioners may be employed by physicians.  Thus, the PTs stand alone in South 
Carolina. Physicians' offices may not provide PT services by employing licensed 
PTs, and PTs may not provide services while employed by a physician or 
physicians' practice group.   
With this background in mind, Kristin Joseph, a PT, and two orthopedic 
surgeons, Doctors Thomas N. Joseph and William G. McCarthy (collectively, 
Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order dismissing their claims challenging a 
2011 position statement from the Board, which opined that within a group practice, 
if a PT or physical therapist assistant (PTA) provides services to a patient—at the 
request of another PT or PTA employed within the same practice—the act does not 
constitute a "referral" under section 40-45-110(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code, 
as construed in Sloan v. South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiners, 
370 S.C. 452, 636 S.E.2d 598 (2006).  We overrule our decision in Sloan, and 
reverse the circuit court's order in this case. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a 2011 position statement in which the Board 
interpreted the fee for referral prohibition contained in section 40-45-110(A)(1) of 
the South Carolina Code as being inapplicable to individual PTs' or associated PT 
groups' employment of other PTs or PTAs.  Section 40-45-110(A)(1) allows the 
Board to take disciplinary action against a PT who
16 

  
requests, receives, participates, or engages directly or indirectly in the 
dividing, transferring, assigning, rebating, or refunding of fees 
received for professional services or profits by means of a credit or 
other valuable consideration including, but not limited to, wages, an 
unearned commission, discount, or gratuity with a person who 
referred a patient, or with a relative or business associate of the 
referring person. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-45-110(A)(1) (2011).   
 
 The 2011 Position Statement was the Board's second position statement 
interpreting section 40-45-110(A)(1).  The Board first issued a position statement 
in 2004 (2004 Position Statement), endorsing an opinion of the South Carolina 
Attorney General, which concluded that a PT would violate section 40-45-
110(A)(1) if he or she was employed by a physician or physician groups, and 
accepted wages for treatment of patients referred by the employing physician or 
group. See S.C. Atty. Gen. Op. dated March 30, 2004 (2004 WL 736934).  
Specifically, the Attorney General's opinion addressed two questions concerning 
the use of the word "person" in section 40-45-110(A)(1) as it relates to physicians.  
See id.  It opined first that physicians were persons within the meaning of the 
statute, and that PTs could not be employed by physicians or physician groups and 
receive wages to treat patients referred by the physician or group for physical 
therapy services. Id.   
 
 Subsequent to the 2004 Position Statement, Dr. Allen Sloan, along with 
other physicians, PTs, and other medical professional associations, brought an 
action in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that a physician may 
lawfully employ a PT and refer patients to that PT.  Sloan, 370 S.C. at 466, 636 
S.E.2d at 605. Ultimately, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' causes of 
actions. Id.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling in a 3-2 
decision. Id. at 485–86, 636 S.E.2d at 616.   
 
 The majority held that the circuit court correctly interpreted section 40-45-
110(A)(1) as prohibiting in-practice referrals from a physician to a PT.  Id. at 473, 
636 S.E.2d at 609. The majority further found that the Board's formal endorsement 
of the Attorney General's opinion did not constitute improper rulemaking in 
violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) because it was "nothing 
17 

  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
more than a policy or guidance statement which does not have the force or effect of 
law in any individual case."  Id. at 474, 636 S.E.2d at 610. 
The majority rejected appellants' constitutional challenges to section 40-45-
110(A)(1). Id. at 476–86, 636 S.E.2d at 611–16. The majority held that section 
40-45-110(A)(1) did not violate the equal protection rights of PTs who wish to be 
employed by physicians who refer patients to them, because the Legislature had "a 
rational basis for defining the pertinent classification in this instance as the class of
physical therapists [which was to avoid] overuse of physical therapy services and 
actual and potential conflicts of interest stemming from a physician's financial 
interest in the provision of therapy services."  Id. at 481–82, 636 S.E.2d at 613–14. 
The majority further held that "[t]he statute prohibiting employment relationships 
between physicians and physical therapists bears a reasonable relationship to a 
legitimate interest of government, and the Legislature has not engaged in an 
arbitrary or wrongful act in enacting the statute."  Id. at 484, 636 S.E.2d at 615. 
Finally, the majority found no procedural due process violation, as:  (1) the hearing 
at issue was a regularly scheduled meeting during which the appellants'
representatives were present to offer comments regarding their respective 
positions; (2) the Board voted in open session to adopt the Attorney General's 
opinion; and (3) the Board began enforcing the statute following a ninety-day 
grace period.  Id. at 485, 636 S.E.2d at 615. 
The dissent, however, would have held that the plain language of section 40-
45-110(A)(1) does not prohibit all employee-employer relationships between a 
physician and PT. Id. at 486, 636 S.E.2d at 616 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).  Although 
the dissent agreed that there had been no violation of the appellants' procedural due 
process rights, in the dissent's view, the majority's interpretation of the statute 
would result in a violation of the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due 
process. Id. (Toal, C.J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent would have found that the 
Board failed to comply with the APA in adopting the Attorney General's opinion, 
thereby promulgating an invalid regulation.  Id. (Toal, C.J., dissenting).1 
1 Subsequent to this Court's decision in Sloan, two companion bills were 
introduced in the Legislature in an attempt to overturn the statutory prohibition on 
PTs working for physicians. The bills, however, were unsuccessful.  See S.B. 
1031, H.B. 4329, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (S.C. 2010).
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On May 3, 2011, Robert Carpenter, a practicing PT, wrote a letter to the 
Board requesting that it issue a position statement addressing whether section 40-
45-110(A)(1) prohibits:  (1) a physical therapist from working for pay for another 
PT, PTA, or group of PTs when the PT or PTA refers a patient to another PT or 
PTA for physical therapy services; and (2) a PT or PTA from working for pay for a 
professional corporation owned by one or more licensed PTs when a PT owner or 
employee of the corporation refers a patient to the PT for physical therapy services. 
On June 2, 2011, Marilyn Swygert, the Chairman of the Board responded 
with a letter entitled: "Application of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 40-45-110(A)(1) to 
Intra-Professional Interactions." In the letter, Swygert stated that in her view, the 
answer to both of Carpenter's questions was "no."  During a regularly scheduled 
meeting on August 17, 2011, the Board voted to adopt the position stated in 
Swygert's letter.  The Board subsequently posted a position statement (2011 
Position Statement) on its website.  The 2011 Position Statement provided, in 
pertinent part: 
In a group practice, a [PT] or [PTA] providing services to a patient of 
that practice should not fall within this definition of a "referral."  The 
[PT] or [PTA] seeing a patient at the request of another [PT] in the 
same group does not constitute a "referral," but is rather a [PT] or 
[PTA] providing coverage either within the 30-day window or 
pursuant to the same referral from a physician or other member of the 
group. 
Shortly thereafter, Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action against the 
Board and the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 
(collectively, Respondents). In Appellants' first six causes of action, they 
challenged the 2011 Position Statement on the grounds that it:  (1) is contrary to 
the plain language of section 40-45-110(A)(1) given that there is no distinction 
between a "referral" from a physician to a PT and "coverage" between PTs; (2) 
exceeds the agency's authority under the APA; and (3) is in violation of Appellants'
state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.2  In the 
alternative, Appellants argued that if the "coverage" exception is a proper 
interpretation of section 40-45-110(A)(1), it should be applied equally to physician 
and physician owned practices.  Appellants' seventh through ninth causes of action 
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; S.C. Const. art. I, § 3. 
19 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sought to argue against the precedent in Sloan, contending that the Court in Sloan
incorrectly interpreted section 40-45-110(A)(1) to prohibit a physician or physician 
group from employing a PT and referring a patient to the PT for physical therapy 
services. 
Respondents moved to dismiss the case, arguing:  there was no justiciable 
controversy; Appellants lacked standing; the complaint failed to state a claim as to 
the seventh through ninth causes of action; the complaint stated no claim upon 
which relief could be granted; and Appellants' claims were not ripe for review.  
After a hearing, the circuit court granted Respondents' motion in part.  In so ruling, 
the court converted Respondents' motion to one for partial summary judgment with 
respect to Appellants' seventh through ninth causes of action, finding that it was 
"bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Sloan" and that it had no authority to 
overrule Sloan. The circuit court denied Respondents' motion as to Appellants'
causes of action one through six.  The circuit court further found that Appellants 
had standing to bring their claims because Appellants' injury is "the infringement 
on their abilities to practice their chosen profession and the disparate treatment 
under the 2011 Position Statement in allowing PTs or PT groups to refer patients 
for PT services to PTs under the guise of 'coverage' and not allowing physicians or 
physician groups to refer patients for PT services to employed PTs under the guise 
of 'coverage.'"  In addition, the circuit court ruled that standing could be conferred 
on appellants as the procedural and substantive implications of the 2011 Position 
Statement constituted an issue of public importance. 
Subsequently, Appellants moved for summary judgment on their first 
through sixth causes of action, and Respondents filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court held a hearing on January 1, 2014, and on April 22, 
2014, entered an order granting Respondents' motions for summary judgment and 
denying Appellants' motion for summary judgment.  
In upholding the 2011 Position Statement, the circuit court found that the 
transition in treatment of patients from one PT to another PT or PTA within a 
group physical therapy practice was not a "referral" prohibited by section 40-45-
110(A)(1), as interpreted by Sloan. According to the circuit court, "referrals" 
targeted by section 40-45-110(A)(1) are limited to "referrals of gatekeeping 
physicians," and not the "transition of patients from one PT to another PT within a 
group practice [that] normally occurs as a simple function of scheduling and 
patient request or convenience."  The court also concluded that "a PT sending or 
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directing a patient to another PT (or PTA) for treatment within a group practice 
does not implicate the potential abuse that the Legislature sought to curtail in 
enacting the prohibition on self-interested 'referrals' in [section] 40-45-110(A)(1), 
namely overuse of physical therapy services."  The court further stated that 
prohibiting the transition of patients from one PT to another would effectively ban 
the group practice of physical therapy, as PTs would be "forced to operate as solo 
practitioners in order to continue their practice."   
The circuit court rejected Appellants' alternative argument that, even if the
2011 Position Statement properly interpreted section 40-45-110(A)(1), PTs should 
be able to work for referring physicians because their treatment of referred patients 
would merely be "coverage" for the referring physician.  The court refused to 
"create a backdoor around Sloan," determining that Appellants' requested 
"coverage" exception would impermissibly "declare conduct lawful that Sloan 
declared unlawful."  As for Appellants' argument with regard to the APA, the 
circuit court found that the 2011 Position Statement did not violate the APA 
because—similar to the 2004 Position Statement in Sloan—it is "not a regulation 
or the equivalent of a regulation." 
Finally, the circuit court disagreed with Appellants' claim that the 2011 
Position Statement violated their equal protection and due process rights.  After 
noting that these claims were "foreclosed by the [this] Court's decision in Sloan," it 
stated that "both Sloan and the 2011 Position Statement treat all physicians the 
same as all other physicians, and all PTs the same as all other PTs."  The court also 
found that the 2011 Position Statement "does not prohibit [Appellants] from doing 
anything, and thus does not deprive them of any property right, with or without due 
process." 
Following the circuit court's denial of their motion to reconsider pursuant to 
Rule 59(e), SCRCP, Appellants appealed the circuit court's order to the court of 
appeals. This Court granted Appellants' motion to certify the appeal pursuant to 
Rule 204(b), SCACR. Subsequently, the Court granted Appellants' motion to 
argue against Sloan pursuant to Rule 217, SCACR. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court 
applies the same standard as that used by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), 
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SCRCP. Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011); see 
Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c), SCRCP; 
Turner, 392 S.C. at 766, 708 S.E.2d at 769.  In an appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, 
and inferences arising in and from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 151, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65 (2004).
ANALYSIS
I. Standing 
As an initial matter, we address Respondents' contention that Appellants 
lack standing to challenge the 2011 Position Statement, and hold that Appellants 
have standing to bring their claims. 
A fundamental prerequisite to institute an action is the requirement that the 
plaintiff have standing. Blandon v. Coleman, 285 S.C. 472, 330 S.E.2d 298 
(1985). Standing is defined as "a personal stake in the subject matter of a lawsuit."  
Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. Of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., 345 
S.C. 594, 600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (citing Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Charleston Cnty. Election Comm'n, 336 S.C. 174, 519 S.E.2d 567 (1999)).  The 
United States Supreme Court has set forth the "irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing," which consists of three elements:  (1) the plaintiff must have suffered 
an "injury in fact;" (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."  Sea Pines 
Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc., 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61 
(1992)). A party seeking to establish standing carries the burden of demonstrating 
each element.  Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 
This declaratory judgment action was initiated by a physical therapist and 
two orthopedic surgeons. It is difficult to conceive of individuals more impacted 
by this Court's decision in Sloan and the 2011 Position Statement from the South 
Carolina Board of Physical Therapy.  PT Joseph has been injured by the 
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infringement on her ability to practice her chosen profession and by the adoption of 
a regulation that requires she and other PTs be treated differently from other health 
care professionals who may be employed by doctors.  By extension, Drs. Joseph 
and McCarthy have been injured because they have an interest in how the PT 
system works and in their ability to employ PTs.  Further, a causal connection 
exists between Appellants' injury and the Board's challenged actions, including the 
2011 Position Statement, and there is a likelihood that their injuries would be 
redressed by a favorable decision. See id. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291. 
The dissent supports its position that Appellants lack standing, in part, on the 
fact that "PT Joseph will not be punished or disciplined as a result of the 2011 
Position Statement."  Thus, under the dissent's analysis no party could ever achieve 
the requisite standing to challenge Sloan unless a party consciously disregarded the 
opinion and willfully violated the law.  The only viable avenue to seek redress and 
access to our courts cannot be solely through disregarding our laws.   
The ability to challenge precedent is a paramount principle of our judicial 
system.  Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 434, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004) 
("Citizens must be afforded access to the judicial process to address alleged 
injustices."). This is especially true in this context where Appellants brought 
claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act, which affords a party the right to 
question the construction or validity of a statute or legal instrument that allegedly 
affects a right, status, or legal relationship. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-30 (2005); see 
also Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 16, 567 S.E.2d 881, 888–89 
(Ct. App. 2002) (quoting another source) ("The Declaratory Judgment Act should 
be liberally construed to accomplish its intended purpose of affording a speedy and 
inexpensive method of deciding legal disputes and of settling legal rights and 
relationships, without awaiting a violation of the rights or a disturbance of the 
relationships."). Accordingly, we decline to create an insurmountable hurdle—as 
the dissent would have us do—for parties to gain access to our courts. 
II. Overruling Sloan
On the merits, Appellants argue, inter alia, that the 2011 Position Statement 
violates their constitutional rights to equal protection and due process by allowing 
PTs to be employed by another PT or a physical therapy group and provide 
physical therapy services to patients referred by the employer, whereas Sloan does 
not allow PTs to be employed by a physician or physician group and provide 
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physical therapy services to the employer's referred patient.  For the same reasons 
discussed in the dissent in Sloan, we take this opportunity to overrule that decision.  
See 370 S.C. at 486–94, 636 S.E.2d at 616–20 (Toal, C.J. dissenting).   
While adherence to precedent under the rubric of stare decisis is 
commendable and provides certainty and consistency within our judicial system, 
adherence to precedent that is wrong serves no such laudable purpose. McLeod v. 
Starnes, 396 S.C. 647, 654, 723 S.E.2d 198, 202 (2012) (alteration in original) 
(quoting another source) ("There is no virtue in sinning against light or persisting 
in palpable error, for nothing is settled until it is settled right. . . . There should be 
no blind adherence to a precedent which, if it is wrong, should be corrected at the 
first practical moment."). The underpinning of Sloan is the assumption that 
physicians who refer patients to physical therapists under their employ will act in 
bad faith or be mired in a conflict of interest because of the financial remuneration 
they receive from the provision of such service.  We choose to make no such 
assumption concerning our brothers and sisters in the medical profession. 
The Equal Protection Clause provides, "nor [shall any State] deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1. Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect 
class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used.  Denene, Inc. v. 
City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 91, 596 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2004) (citation omitted).  
Under the rational basis test, the Court must determine: (1) whether the law treats 
similarly situated entities differently; (2) if so, whether the legislative body has a 
rational basis for the disparate treatment; and (3) whether the disparate treatment 
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.  Dunes W. Golf 
Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280, 293-94, 737 S.E.2d 601, 608 
(2013) (citing Ed Robinson Laundry & Dry Cleaning, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Rev.,
356 S.C. 120, 124, 588 S.E.2d 97, 99 (2003)). 
 In  Sloan, this Court interpreted section 40-45-110(A)(1) of the South 
Carolina Code as prohibiting a PT from being employed by a physician when the 
physician refers patients to the PT for services.  Contrary to that decision, we now 
find that the classification, which distinguishes PTs from other licensed health care 
professionals, has no rational relationship to the legislative purpose of the statute— 
to protect consumers and government-sponsored health care programs from 
conflicts of interest and potential misuse of medical services. See id. at 493–94, 
636 S.E.2d at 619–20. Section 40-45-110(A)(1) should prevent only referral-for-
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pay situations, an interpretation which comports with the clear purpose of the 
statute. The overarching prohibition created as a result of the Court's opinion in 
Sloan is arbitrary and not calculated to avoid the legislative purpose of prohibiting 
the unethical behavior of receiving or giving illegal kickbacks and participating in 
referral-for-pay agreements. Id. at 489, 636 S.E.2d at 617.  To find otherwise 
would be arbitrary and violative of the equal protection rights of PTs. 
Although, under Sloan, physicians may employ other healthcare professionals such 
as occupational therapists, speech pathologists, and nurse practitioners, they may 
not employ PTs. Neither the Sloan opinion nor Appellants have articulated any 
plausible reason as to why PTs are so different from other health care professionals 
that they must be singled out and provided disparate treatment for self-referral 
purposes. Accordingly, the Court's interpretation in Sloan constitutes an equal 
protection violation.  In addition, the interpretation violates the substantive due 
process rights of physical therapists by imposing an arbitrary restriction upon 
physical therapists while preserving those employment relationships for all other 
health care providers and allied health professionals.  See Worsley Co., Inc. v. 
Town of Mount Pleasant, 339 S.C. 51, 56, 528 S.E.2d 657, 660 (2000) 
("Substantive due process protects a person from being deprived of life, liberty or 
property for arbitrary reasons." (citing Anco, Inc. v. State Health & Human 
Services Finance Comm'n, 300 S.C. 432, 388 S.E.2d 780 (1989)).
We now recognize that the interpretation in Sloan creates an absurd situation 
by strictly prohibiting physician-PT employment relationship without considering 
the resulting ethical implications or patient wellbeing.  See id. at 489, 636 S.E.2d at 
617. In fact, prohibiting physicians' employment of PTs deprives physicians of 
their right to practice medicine in the best interests of their patients.  As interpreted 
in Sloan, section 40-45-110(A)(1) appears merely to be anti-competitive 
protectionist legislation intended to protect personal financial interests, which is 
driven by reimbursement purposes, rather than actual benefits to patients.  
Accordingly, we overrule Sloan as an unconstitutional interpretation of section 40-
45-110(A)(1), and hold that the statute prohibits only referral-for-pay situations 
rather than prohibiting all employer-employee relationships between physicians 
and physical therapists. 
We acknowledge that the Legislature's failure to alter a statute constitutes 
"evidence the Legislature agrees with this Court's interpretation" of the statute.  See 
McLeod, 396 S.C. at 660, 723 S.E.2d at 205.  In this case, however, it is of no 
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moment that the General Assembly has not acted to alter section 40-45-110(A)(1) 
in light of our decision in Sloan. It is the duty of this Court, not the legislature, to 
determine the constitutionality of a statute. Because we hold that the majority's
construction of the statute in Sloan is unconstitutional, this inaction on the part of 
the legislature is irrelevant. 
III. 2011 Position Statement 
The 2011 Position Statement expands upon the harm done by the majority's 
interpretation of section 40-45-110(A) in Sloan by permitting PTs to refer patients 
to other PTs within the same group practice—when, under Sloan, physicians are 
not permitted to make similar self-referrals.  For the reasons discussed, infra, and 
because we overrule Sloan, we therefore reverse the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment to Respondents.   
Moreover, we hold that the Board's adoption of the 2011 Position Statement 
violates the requirements of the APA.  The circuit court found that the 2011 
Position Statement "is not a regulation or the equivalent of a regulation."  To the 
contrary, the 2011 Position Statement was adopted to protect PTs and PT groups 
from disciplinary action under section 40-45-110(A)(1), was intended to have the 
force of law, and therefore constitutes a binding norm. 
Under the APA, a regulation is defined as an "agency statement of general 
public applicability that implements or prescribes law or policy or practice 
requirements of any agency. Policy or guidance issued by an agency other than in 
a regulation does not have the force or effect of law."  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-
10(4) (2005). Whether a particular agency creates a regulation or simply 
announces a general policy statement depends on whether the agency action 
establishes a "binding norm."  Home Health Serv., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Com'n, 312 S.C. 
324, 328, 440 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1994).  The "key inquiry" is 
the extent to which the challenged policy leaves the agency free to 
exercise its discretion to follow or not to follow that general policy in 
an individual case, or on the other hand, whether the policy so fills out 
the statutory scheme that upon application one need only determine 
whether a given case is within the rule's criterion.  As long as the  
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agency remains free to consider the individual facts in the various 
cases that arise, then the agency action in question has not established 
a binding norm.
Sloan, 370 S.C. at 491, 636 S.E.2d 598 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ryder 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1983)).  "When 
there is a close question whether a pronouncement is a policy statement or a 
regulation, the [agency] should promulgate the ruling as a regulation in compliance 
with the APA." Home Health Serv., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Com'n, 312 S.C. at 329, 440 
S.E.2d at 378.
Article I, section 22 of our state's constitution provides that "[n]o person 
shall be finally bound by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision of an administrative 
agency affecting private rights except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard 
... and he shall have in all such instances the right to judicial review." S.C. Const. 
art. I, § 22. Further, the APA specifically requires an agency to: provide public 
notice of a drafting period where public comments can be accepted; conduct a 
public hearing on the proposed regulation; possibly prepare reports about the 
regulation's impact on the economy, environment, and public health; and submit 
the regulation to the Legislature for review, modification, and approval or 
rejection. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-110 to -160 (2005).   
The Board satisfied none of these requirements when it adopted the 2011 
Position Statement. In adopting the 2011 Position Statement, the Board merely 
identified the consideration of Swygert's letter on its agenda as "discussion of 
Intra-Professional Interactions"—thus essentially providing no notice to the public 
of what the Board was deciding. 
Moreover, the Board intended PTs and PT groups to rely on the 2011 
Position Statement.  The 2011 Position Statement leaves no question regarding 
whether a PT employed by another PT or PT group who is directed patients for 
physical therapy, and is paid for those services, is in violation of the referral for 
profit prohibition in section 40-45-110(A)(1).  Based on the 2011 Position 
Statement, the Board is not free to exercise its discretion as to whether to follow 
the position set forth in the 2011 Position Statement in an individual case.  In other 
words, the 2011 Position Statement constitutes a "binding norm," and has the effect 
of a regulation under the APA. The Board's process in adopting the 2011 Position 
Statement thus amounts to administrative overreach that attempts to end run the 
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legislative process. Accordingly, we hold that the Board violated the APA by 
adopting the 2011 Position Statement without promulgating it as a regulation.3 
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we overrule Sloan and reverse the circuit court's 
decision granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment.   
HEARN, J., concurs. KITTREDGE, J., concurring in result in a separate 
opinion. BEATTY, J., dissenting in a separate opinion in which PLEICONES, 
C.J., concurs. 
3 We embrace completely the excellent comprehensive analysis of administrative 
agency rulemaking set forth in sections I, II, and III of Justice Kittredge's
concurring opinion. We believe both the statutory law of South Carolina and 
Article I, section 22 of the South Carolina Constitution are violated by the Board's 
attempt to use its 2011 position statement to regulate the practice of physical 
therapy without submitting it to the General Assembly as a proposed agency 
regulation following the requirements of the South Carolina Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
That said we adhere to the finding in the majority opinion that the Board's 
actions also violate the equal protection and due process protections of the United 
States Constitution.
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE: This case brings the Court face-to-face with the 
leviathan known as administrative agency rule-making—the so-called Fourth 
Branch of government—and illustrates the danger it poses to the once sacrosanct 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.  Therefore, I concur in the result 
reached by the majority, which overrules Sloan v. South Carolina Board of 
Physical Therapy Examiners, 370 S.C. 452, 636 S.E.2d 598 (2006), for Sloan 
allowed the State's administrative agencies to effectively ignore the rule-making 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).4  However, I would not 
go as far as the majority in declaring Sloan's interpretation of section 40-45-
110(A)(1)5 (the Statute) unconstitutional.  I would resolve this case solely on 
statutory grounds, leaving the constitutional issue for a later day, when it may be 
considered in the context of a properly promulgated regulation. See, e.g., In re 
Care & Treatment of McCracken, 346 S.C. 87, 92, 551 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2001) 
("[I]t is this Court's firm policy to decline to rule on constitutional issues unless 
such a ruling is required." (citing Fairway Ford, Inc. v. Cnty. of Greenville, 324 
S.C. 84, 86, 476 S.E.2d 490, 491 (1996))).  Therefore, beyond the majority's
analysis concerning standing, I would go only so far as applying then-Chief Justice 
Toal's analysis of the APA in Sloan to the facts of this case.  See Sloan, 370 S.C. at 
486, 636 S.E.2d at 616 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that, by issuing a 
position statement adopting a 2004 Attorney General opinion interpreting the 
Statute, the South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiners (the Board) 
ignored the APA's requirements and promulgated an invalid regulation). In my 
view, the Board's 2011 position statement suffers from the same infirmity as its 
2004 counterpart and is likewise invalid. 
I. 
This case implicates far more than the practice of physical therapy in South 
Carolina, for it touches on an issue central to the constitutional framework of our 
republic. We once viewed the three branches of that government as separate, each 
operating in a distinct sphere within which its authority was inviolable.  See, e.g., 
Palmetto Golf Club v. Robinson, 143 S.C. 347, 373, 141 S.E. 610, 617 (1928) 
(Carter, J., concurring) ("Under the Constitution of South Carolina, the three 
4 See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10 to -300 (2005 & Supp. 2015). 
5 Id. § 40-45-110(A)(1) (2011). 
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branches of the government, legislative, judicial, and executive, have separate 
functions to perform, and one branch of the government must not encroach upon 
the other . . . .").  That division has become blurred in the area of administrative 
law, where executive branch agencies routinely perform functions traditionally 
within the sole province of the other two branches of government.  See, e.g., City 
of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting that administrative agencies, although part of the executive branch, 
"exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; 
executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial 
power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found 
to have violated their rules"); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that administrative agencies are often referred to as 
"quasi-legislative, quasi-executive[,] or quasi-judicial" and that use of the qualifier 
"quasi" is an implicit acknowledgment "that all recognized classifications have 
broken down"); see also id. at 487 ("[Administrative agencies] have become a 
veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch 
legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-
dimensional thinking."). 
The rise of administrative agencies has allowed legislatures, with the courts'
blessing, to increasingly abdicate their lawmaking responsibility.  See City of 
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the rise of 
administrative agencies as the vehicle through which a "dramatic shift in power" 
from Congress to the executive branch has occurred over the past half century); 
Fed. Power Comm'n v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in result) ("The notion that the Constitution narrowly 
confines the power of Congress to delegate authority to administrative agencies, 
which was briefly in vogue in the 1930's, has been virtually abandoned by the 
Court for all practical purposes . . . .").  Even as early as 1952, Justice Jackson 
could say that "perhaps more values today are affected by [administrative 
agencies'] decisions than by those of all the courts."  Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. at 487 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). This trend has continued over the decades and regrettably 
shows no signs of slowing down any time soon.  See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Congress created more than fifty 
new agencies between 1997 and 2012 and "more are on the way"); Caring Hearts 
Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 14-3243, 2016 WL 3064870, at *1 (10th 
Cir. May 31, 2016) ("The number of formal rules [administrative] agencies have 
issued thanks to their delegated legislative authority has grown so exuberantly it's 
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hard to keep up. The Code of Federal Regulations now clocks in at over 175,000 
pages. And no one seems sure how many more hundreds of thousands (or maybe 
millions) of pages of less formal or 'sub-regulatory' policy manuals, directives, and 
the like might be found floating around these days.").  
The consolidation of power accompanying the rise of the administrative state has 
not gone unnoticed. Nor has this trend, which threatens to undo the Founders'
deliberate weaving of separation of powers into the fabric of our government, been 
without its detractors. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct.
1225, 1254–55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (acknowledging that 
by failing to enforce the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution, the 
Court was complicit in the concentration of power "in the hands of a vast and 
unaccountable administrative apparatus").  In a dissenting opinion critical of 
courts' overly deferential treatment of administrative agencies, Chief Justice 
Roberts channeled James Madison, who "famously wrote that the accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, . . . may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."  City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 
1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (ellipsis in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); accord Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1244 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) (recognizing the text of the Federal Constitution, as well 
as the debates and writings surrounding its enactment, "reflect a conviction that the 
power to make the law and the power to enforce it must be kept separate, 
particularly with respect to the regulation of private conduct").  The Chief Justice 
went on to acknowledge the public perception of administrative agencies as 
faceless bureaucracies, admitting that  
the citizen confronting thousands of pages of regulations— 
promulgated by an agency directed by Congress to regulate, say, "in 
the public interest"—can perhaps be excused for thinking that it is the
agency really doing the legislating.  And with hundreds of federal 
agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life, that citizen 
might also understandably question whether Presidential oversight—a 
critical part of the Constitutional plan—is always an effective
safeguard against agency overreaching.   
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  This observation 
echoed concerns expressed by Professor Charles A. Reich, who has described "the 
growth of the administrative, bureaucratic state" as  
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the greatest single threat to the survival of the Framers' Constitution.  
Their tripartite scheme of legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
has been altered almost beyond recognition by the dominance of a 
Fourth Branch of government which combines in itself powers of each 
original branch and engages in detailed management rather than 
traditional limited government. 
Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 Yale L.J. 1409, 1430–31 (1991). 
This threat is far from theoretical, of concern only to judges and academics.  One 
need look no further than the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Caring Hearts for 
an example of the dangers posed by an unchecked administrative state.  Caring 
Hearts, a provider of home nursing and physical therapy services, engaged in a 
lengthy—and until recently, futile—battle with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), an administrative agency within the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, over the legality of payments Caring Hearts received 
for services provided to Medicare participants in 2008.  See Caring Hearts, 2016 
WL 3064870, at *1–2. Caring Hearts was ultimately successful because, as the 
Tenth Circuit noted, the regulations upon which CMS relied did not exist when the 
contested services were rendered.  Id. at *2. Not only that, but the regulations that 
did exist at the relevant times supported Caring Hearts's position, not CMS's.  See 
id. at *2–6. However, until the Tenth Circuit's decision, CMS had successfully 
convinced every administrative and judicial tribunal the agency appeared before 
that Caring Hearts knowingly engaged in unlawful conduct by violating 
"regulations that were [at the time the conduct occurred] but figments of the 
rulemakers' imagination, still years away from adoption."  Id. at *2. 
The dispute between Caring Hearts and CMS began when, after an audit, CMS 
determined the government paid Caring Hearts approximately $800,000 for 
services that were not compensable under federal law, leading CMS to demand that 
Caring Hearts refund the payments.  Id. at *1 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(a), 
1395y(a)(1)(A)). Caring Hearts appealed CMS's decision, correctly contending 
that CMS was relying on regulations that did not exist when Caring Hearts 
provided the services in 2008. See id. at *2. Yet, at every step up the 
administrative ladder, CMS prevailed, with bureaucrats, an administrative law 
judge, and even a federal district judge all accepting CMS's claim that Caring 
Hearts had violated properly promulgated regulations.  See id. at *2–6; see also 
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Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2700-CM, 2014 WL 
4259151, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 2014) (citations omitted) (describing Caring 
Hearts's journey through the administrative appeals process), vacated sub nom. 
Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 14-3243, 2016 WL 
3064870 (10th Cir. May 31, 2016).  Given the long-established principle "that 
considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,"6 it is not surprising CMS was 
repeatedly successful in defending its actions, even when they were subjected to 
judicial scrutiny. See Caring Hearts, 2014 WL 4259151, at *2–3, *8, *14–16 
(finding substantial evidence supported the agency's determination that the 
contested services were non-compensable).  CMS's winning streak may not have 
ended but for the minor detail, mentioned above, that the regulations CMS 
contended Caring Hearts knowingly violated did not exist when Caring Hearts 
supposedly violated them.  Caring Hearts, 2016 WL 3064870, at *2. 
In rejecting CMS's bold attempt to enforce nonexistent regulations, the Tenth 
Circuit stated what should have been, but apparently was not, obvious when it 
observed that "surely one thing no agency can do is apply the wrong law to citizens 
who come before it, especially when the right law would appear to support the 
citizen and not the agency." Id. at *2. In its conclusion, the court again touched on 
the dangers posed by a single governmental body being allowed to write, enforce, 
and interpret the law: "[A]n agency decision," the court said, "that loses track of its 
own controlling regulations and applies the wrong rules in order to penalize private 
citizens can never stand." Id. at *7. Therefore, although Caring Hearts ultimately 
prevailed, it did so only after litigating the issue to the second-highest federal court 
in the United States.7  The fact that Caring Hearts had to go to such extraordinary 
6 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984); accord Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 
411 S.C. 16, 34, 766 S.E.2d 707, 718 (2014) ("[O]ur deference doctrine provides 
that courts defer to an administrative agency's interpretations with respect to the 
statutes entrusted to its administration or its own regulations 'unless there is a 
compelling reason to differ.'" (quoting S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 363 S.C. 67, 75, 610 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2005))). 
7 The Tenth Circuit hinted that, on remand, CMS should concede its position was 
not "substantially justified," thus allowing Caring Hearts to recover some of its 
litigation expenses from the government.  Caring Hearts, 2016 WL 3064870, at *7 
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lengths to challenge the agency's fiat demonstrates the wisdom of the Founders'
division of power among three co-equal branches of government, and it is with this 
background in mind that I consider the present case. 
II. 
In South Carolina, to preserve some semblance of the separation of powers we 
once held sacred, an administrative agency may not make law without legislative 
oversight and approval. This legislative accountability is accomplished through 
the APA, which requires, with some exceptions not applicable here, the submission 
of proposed regulations to the General Assembly.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-120 
(Supp. 2015). If the General Assembly does not act to disapprove an agency's
proposed regulation within a certain period of time, the regulation becomes 
effective. Id. § 1-23-120(D). 
The question then becomes, "What constitutes a regulation, such that an agency 
must comply with the APA?"  That question was correctly answered by the dissent 
in Sloan, which recognized that an agency creates a regulation requiring APA 
compliance, as opposed to "a general policy statement," which does not, when the 
agency's action "establishes a binding norm."  Sloan, 370 S.C. at 491, 636 S.E.2d 
at 618 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Home Health Serv., Inc. v. S.C. Tax 
Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 328, 440 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-10(4) (2005) (defining a regulation, in 
part, as "each agency statement of general public applicability that implements or 
prescribes law or policy or practice requirements of any agency"). 
The key inquiry, therefore, is the extent to which the challenged 
policy leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion to follow or not 
to follow that general policy in an individual case, or on the other 
hand, whether the policy so fills out the statutory scheme that upon 
application one need only determine whether a given case is within 
the rule's criterion. As long as the agency remains free to consider the
individual facts in the various cases that arise, then the agency action 
in question has not established a binding norm.
(citation omitted).   
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Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir.1983), 
quoted in Sloan, 370 S.C. at 491, 636 S.E.2d at 618 (Toal, C.J., dissenting). In 
addition, "when there is a close question whether a pronouncement is a policy 
statement or regulation, the [agency] should promulgate the ruling as a regulation 
in compliance with the APA."  Home Health Serv., Inc., 312 S.C. at 329, 440 
S.E.2d at 378. 
Turning to the facts of this case, which Justice Toal ably recounts in the Court's 
opinion, it is clear the Board, in adopting the 2011 position statement interpreting 
the Statute, "promulgated an invalid regulation because [it] failed to comply with 
the rule-making provisions of the APA."  Sloan, 370 S.C. at 491, 636 S.E.2d at 619 
(Toal, C.J., dissenting). The 2011 position statement declaring intra-practice 
referrals among physical therapists lawful, like its 2004 predecessor declaring 
similar referrals between physicians and physical therapists unlawful, gives the 
Board no discretion to consider the facts of a particular case before it—once facts 
are established satisfying the position statement's criteria, the Board's hands are 
tied—making the position statement a quintessential regulation. See Ryder Truck 
Lines, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1377 (noting the lack of agency discretion is the hallmark 
of a regulation).
In finding the 2004 position statement did not amount to a regulation, the majority 
in Sloan incorrectly held that the Statute itself "prohibit[s] a physical therapist from
working as an employee of a physician when the physician refers patients to the 
physical therapist for services." Sloan, 370 S.C. at 473, 636 S.E.2d at 609. 
Perhaps the General Assembly would have approved a regulation promulgated by 
the Board to proscribe that conduct, but the language of the Statute makes it clear 
the legislature also could have rejected such a regulation.  Section 40-45-110 
provides that the Board may take action against a licensed physical therapist who 
requests, receives, participates, or engages directly or indirectly in the 
dividing, transferring, assigning, rebating, or refunding of fees 
received for professional services or profits by means of a credit or 
other valuable consideration including, but not limited to, wages, an 
unearned commission, discount, or gratuity with a person who 
referred a patient, or with a relative or business associate of the 
referring person. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-45-110(A)(1) (2011).   
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The point is that the General Assembly, by inserting the discretionary term "may,"
was looking to the Board to determine, through the regulatory process, the 
parameters of section 40-45-110. Compare  Collins v. Doe, 352 S.C. 462, 470, 574 
S.E.2d 739, 743 (2002) ("Under the rules of statutory interpretation, use of words 
such as 'shall' or 'must' indicates the legislature's intent to enact a mandatory 
requirement."), with State v. Hill, 314 S.C. 330, 332, 444 S.E.2d 255, 256 (1994) 
("The word 'may' ordinarily signifies permission and generally means the action 
spoken of is optional or discretionary." (quoting Robertson v. State, 276 S.C. 356, 
358, 278 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Indeed, 
ignoring the Statute's discretionary language, as the Sloan majority did,8 the Statute 
is broad enough to prohibit the conduct deemed permissible in the 2011 position 
statement—physical therapists working for and receiving referrals from other 
physical therapists—for on its face the Statute makes no distinction between 
referrals from (or employment by) physicians and referrals from (or employment 
by) other physical therapists.  Cf. Sloan, 370 S.C. at 474–75, 636 S.E.2d at 610 
(finding that the Board's 2004 position statement "did not implement or prescribe 
the law or practice requirements for physical therapists in more detail than set forth 
by statute"). I would not permit the Board to make these important policy 
decisions through the use of mere position statements; instead, I would insist on 
strict compliance with the APA.9 
8 This same fundamental error affected the Attorney General opinion cited in 
Sloan, upon which the Board relied in issuing the 2004 position statement.  See 
Sloan, 370 S.C. at 465, 636 S.E.2d at 605 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 40-45-
110(A)(1); S.C. Att'y Gen. Op. dated March 30, 2004, 2004 WL 736934). The 
Attorney General opinion ignored the Statute's use of "may" and the corresponding 
need for the Board to promulgate regulations determining the proper scope of 
section 40-45-110. See S.C. Att'y Gen. Op., 2004 WL 736934, at *1–2, 5.  The 
Attorney General opinion therefore neglected to consider that the Statute was part 
of a legislative delegation of authority designed to implement a statutory scheme in 
conformity with the APA. Instead, the Attorney General opinion erroneously 
construed the Statute as mandating a particular result and took it upon itself to 
determine what conduct the Statute proscribed.  Id. at *2. 
9 I hasten to add that such strict compliance is not necessary where an 
administrative agency is acting pursuant to valid federal regulations mandating a 
different procedure. See, e.g., Stogsdill v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
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The possible ramifications of violating the Board's position statement further 
convince me of the necessity of requiring strict APA compliance.  In addition to 
license revocation, the Board may impose civil penalties up to $10,000 for 
violations of the Statute. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-45-110(A), -120 (2011).
Moreover, a violation of the Statute subjects the offender to potential criminal 
penalties, including imprisonment for up to ninety days.  Id. § 40-45-200 (2011). 
Given that severe penalties, including criminal prosecution, are associated with a 
statutory violation, I would strictly construe the legislature's grant of authority to 
the Board.10  Doing so, it is clear the General Assembly envisioned it would have 
the opportunity to review specific regulations before they became effective.   
Of course, where the General Assembly hits the proverbial bulls-eye and assigns 
enforcement of a statute to an administrative agency with the command of "shall," 
then the agency shall act accordingly, free from the duplicative effort of formally 
promulgating a regulation.11 See Collins, 352 S.C. at 470, 574 S.E.2d at 743.  But 
410 S.C. 273, 280, 763 S.E.2d 638, 642 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that in the 
context of Medicaid waivers, once the State's waiver application is approved by 
CMS, the waiver's terms carry the force and effect of federal law and need not be 
promulgated as regulations pursuant to the APA), cert. dismissed, 415 S.C. 242, 
781 S.E.2d 719 (2016). 
10 Cf. Nelson v. Ozmint, 390 S.C. 432, 436, 702 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2010) (noting the 
rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are strictly construed against the 
State (citing State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991))).   
11 The majority in Sloan expressed concern over this potential redundancy, stating 
that to require compliance with the APA "would lead to the absurd result that, 
before an agency may enforce a statute, it would have to enact a regulation 
explaining its interpretation and application of the statute in detail and its intention 
of enforcing it."  Sloan, 370 S.C. at 475, 636 S.E.2d at 610.  However, the Sloan 
majority, the Board, and the Attorney General opinion on which the Board relied 
misinterpreted the Statute.  Nowhere does the Statute require the Board to do 
anything. As noted, the Statute speaks only in permissive terms, in anticipation of 
agency-crafted regulations promulgated pursuant to the APA.  Thus, the Sloan 
majority's concern was misplaced. 
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that is far from the situation here.  The Board may not, in my firm judgment, 
determine where to draw the line between legal and illegal conduct under the guise 
of issuing a "policy statement" that avoids the rigors and transparency of an APA-
approved regulation.12  Because Sloan has permitted the Board and the State's other 
administrative agencies to do just that, it must be overruled. 
III. 
The ever increasing reach of the so-called Fourth Branch of government presents a 
threat to our civil society, especially the principle of separation of powers.  If the 
executive branch, through unelected bureaucrats and seemingly countless 
administrative agencies, is going to set policies having the force of law, the judicial 
branch must insist on clear delegation from the legislative branch and strict 
compliance with the APA, including submission of administrative policies having 
the force and effect of law to the legislature for review. 
In sum, I would accord Appellants standing, declare the 2011 position statement 
unlawful, and overrule Sloan. I concur with the majority in result. 
12 In addition to requiring proposed regulations be submitted to the General 
Assembly, the APA also "generally requires a state agency to give notice of a 
drafting period during which public comments are accepted on a proposed 
regulation; conduct a public hearing on the proposed regulation overseen by an 
administrative law judge or an agency's governing board; [and] possibly prepare 
reports about the [proposed] regulation's impact on the economy, environment, and 
public health." Sloan, 370 S.C. at 474, 636 S.E.2d at 609–10.
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JUSTICE BEATTY:  While the majority's decision is laudable, I do not 
believe Appellants have standing to challenge the 2011 Position Statement.  Thus, 
I would affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 220(c) of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules.13 
Although Appellants raise nine arguments, they can be consolidated into two 
categories: (1) the propriety of this Court's decision in Sloan, and (2) the 
procedural and substantive implications of the Board's 2011 Position Statement.   
However, before addressing the merits of this appeal, I believe an initial 
determination must be made as to whether Appellants have standing to challenge 
the 2011 Position Statement and, in turn, petition for this Court to reconsider its 
decision in Sloan. 
"Before any action can be maintained, a justiciable controversy must be 
present." Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. 531, 546, 590 S.E.2d 338, 346 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy 
appropriate for judicial determination, as opposed to a dispute or difference of a 
contingent, hypothetical or abstract character."  Id. "The concept of justiciability 
encompasses the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, and standing." Id. at 547, 590 
S.E.2d at 546.
A plaintiff must have standing to institute an action.  Joytime Distribs. & 
Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 639, 528 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1999).  "To have 
standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit."  Sea 
Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res. & Cmty. 
Servs. Assocs., 345 S.C. 594, 600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001).  In other words, 
one must be a real party in interest.  Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 255, 478 
S.E.2d 841, 845 (1996). "A real party in interest is one who has a real, material, or 
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as opposed to one who has 
only a nominal or technical interest in the action."  Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Charleston Cnty. Election Comm'n, 336 S.C. 174, 181, 519 S.E.2d 567, 571 (1999) 
(quoting Anchor Point Inc. v. Shoals Sewer Co., 308 S.C. 422, 428, 418 S.E.2d 
546, 549 (1992)). "Additionally, a private person may not invoke the judicial 
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action unless he has 
sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, prejudice therefrom."  Evins v. 
13  Rule 220(c), SCACR ("The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, 
decision or judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."). 
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Richland Cnty. Historic Pres. Comm'n, 341 S.C. 15, 21, 532 S.E.2d 876, 879 
(2000). "However, a court may confer standing upon a party when an issue is of 
such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance." Baird v. 
Charleston Cnty., 333 S.C. 519, 531, 511 S.E.2d 69, 75 (1999). 
A party seeking to establish standing must prove the "irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing," which consists of three elements:  (1) the 
plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury and the conduct 
complained of must be causally connected; and (3) it must be likely, rather than 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.  Sea 
Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc., 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61 (1992)).
Cognizant of the above-outlined principles, I begin with an examination of 
the reason Appellants instituted the declaratory judgment action.  As expressed in 
the jurisdictional statement of their pleadings, Appellants invoked the judicial 
power of the circuit court to "determine that the 2011 Position Statement adopted 
August 17, 2011, by the Board regarding the 'Application of 40-45-110(A)(1) to 
Intra-Professional Interactions' violates the provisions of the PT Act and the 
Constitutions of South Carolina and the United States."  Thus, any basis to confer 
standing upon Appellants emanates from a dispute regarding the validity of the 
2011 Position Statement and not, as the majority holds, from a desire to challenge 
Sloan. Unlike the majority, I believe a determination regarding standing must be 
strictly limited to an assessment of the 2011 Position Statement.14  I would find 
Appellants have failed to prove the requisite elements to establish standing.  
14   Interestingly, the more lenient stance enunciated by the members of the 
majority opinion is a marked departure from decisions they authored that strictly 
required those seeking standing to identify a concrete, particularized harm to a 
legally protected interest. See Sea Pines Ass'n for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. 
Dep't of Natural Res. & Cmty. Servs. Assocs., 345 S.C. 594, 550 S.E.2d 287 (2001) 
(concluding Appellants, who were comprised of wildlife organizations, did not 
have standing to challenge the decision by the Department of Natural Resources to 
issue permits to lethally reduce deer population in wildlife sanctuary because they 
failed to allege a particularized harm); see also Carnival Corp. v. Historic 
Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 407 S.C. 67, 753 S.E.2d 846 (2014) (holding 
that objectors, who alleged nuisance and zoning claims against cruise ship 
operations, lacked standing as they failed to allege a concrete, particularized harm 
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First, none of the Appellants have suffered or will suffer an injury that is 
attributable to the 2011 Position Statement.  Without dispute, Drs. Joseph and 
McCarthy are not subject to the 2011 Position Statement because they are 
orthopedic surgeons and not PTs.  Moreover, PT Joseph will not be punished or 
disciplined as a result of the 2011 Position Statement.  In fact, she will actually 
benefit from the Board's position as she can continue to work in a group physical 
therapy practice where, by her own admission, she treats patients sent to her by 
other PTs in the group. Additionally, Appellants do not object to PTs in a group 
practice covering for other PTs nor do they seek to prevent this practice.  Second, 
the injury alleged by Appellants is causally related to the 2004 Position Statement 
addressed in Sloan and not the 2011 Position Statement.  Notably, Dr. McCarthy 
testified they were seeking for the court "[t]o grant us the ability to employ [PTs] 
again, like we did in past," i.e., pre-Sloan operations. Third, even if the Court were 
to declare the 2011 Position Statement void and prohibit PTs from covering for 
other PTs, such a favorable decision provides no discernible relief to Appellants.  
Based on the foregoing, I would find that Appellants have not established 
standing to challenge the 2011 Position Statement.  Moreover, this case does not 
present a question of public importance that would serve as a basis to confer 
standing upon Appellants. Any question of public importance was decided by the 
Court in Sloan. Because Appellants lack standing to institute a challenge to the 
2011 Position Statement, I would affirm the circuit court's order dismissing 
Appellants' claims under Rule 220(c), SCACR.  
Finally, I emphasize that all legislative attempts to overturn Sloan have 
failed. Thus, even if Appellants had standing to challenge our decision in Sloan, a 
decision to overrule Sloan would be contrary to the clear intent of the Legislature 
as section 40-45-110(A)(1) has been in effect since 1998 and has not been 
amended even after this Court's decision in Sloan. If the Legislature believes this 
Court's interpretation in Sloan is in error, it is free to correct any misinterpretation.  
The Legislature's failure to do so in ten years is evidence that it agrees with this 
Court's interpretation of section 40-45-110(A)(1).   See McLeod v. Starnes, 396 
to a legally protected interest); ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 380 S.C. 191, 
669 S.E.2d 337 (2008) (ruling that competitor business, which sought to challenge 
rezoning to a classification that would permit a cell-phone tower, lacked standing 
where the potential injury or prejudice alleged was only an increase in business 
competition). 
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S.C. 647, 660, 723 S.E.2d 198, 205 (2012) ("The Legislature is presumed to be 
aware of this Court's interpretation of its statutes." (citation omitted)); Wigfall v. 
Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 111, 580 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003) (recognizing 
that when the Legislature fails to alter a statute, "its inaction is evidence the 
Legislature agrees with this Court's interpretation" of the statute); State v. One 
Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 321 S.C. 176, 181, 467 S.E.2d 443, 446 (1996) 
("Moreover, our adherence to stare decisis in this case does not implicate the risk 
of the 'petrifying rigidity' in the law that can result from too firm an adherence to 
the doctrine. Because we are adhering to our earlier interpretation of a statute, the 
General Assembly is free to correct any misinterpretation on our part.").   
Unlike the majority, I would hold that Appellants lack standing to institute a 
challenge to the 2011 Position Statement and, in turn, to petition this Court to 
overrule Sloan. In the absence of this fundamental prerequisite, I would affirm the 
circuit court's order dismissing Appellants' claims. 
PLEICONES, C.J., concurs. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Kenneth C. Krawcheck, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001483 
Opinion No. 27667 
Submitted August 18, 2016 – Filed September 14, 2016 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 
Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Kenneth C. Krawcheck, of Charleston, Pro Se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
a definite suspension of three years or disbarment.  Respondent requests that the 
sanction be made retroactive to the date of interim suspension.1 Respondent has 
agreed that within thirty days of imposition of discipline, he will enter into a 
payment plan with the Commission on Lawyer Conduct to (1) pay the costs 
incurred by ODC and the Commission in investigating and prosecuting this matter 
($196); (2) pay Client C, referenced below, $5,000; (3) pay the court reporter 
referenced below $711.63; and (4) reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection in the amount of $400.27.  Respondent has also agreed to complete the 
1 Respondent was placed on interim suspension by order dated July 13, 2012.  In re Krawcheck, 
398 S.C. 594, 730 S.E.2d 856 (2012). 
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Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and Trust Account School prior 
to reinstatement. We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the 
practice of law in this state for three years, retroactive to the date of his interim 
suspension. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
Facts 
Matter A 
By letter dated April 4, 2011, respondent was informed by the South Carolina 
Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization that he was 
suspended from the practice of law for failure to comply with the requirements of 
Rules 408 (compliance with continuing legal education requirements) and 419 
(administrative suspension), SCACR.  On April 26, 2011, respondent appeared at 
opposing counsel's office for the taking of three depositions. Respondent did not 
inform opposing counsel of his suspension.  Respondent's suspension was lifted by 
the Commission on May 18, 2011.
Respondent admits his conduct violated Rule 5.5(a), RPC (a lawyer shall not 
practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in
that jurisdiction). 
Matter B 
In 2010, respondent contracted with a court reporter to provide services for three 
depositions. Respondent has not paid the court reporter.  The amount due is 
$711.63. Respondent admits his failure to pay the court reporter constitutes 
misconduct.  See In re Jackson, 365 S.C. 176, 617 S.E.2d 123 (2005)(failure to 
timely pay a court reporter constitutes grounds for attorney discipline). 
Matter C 
Client C hired respondent to handle a legal matter and paid respondent a $5,000 
retainer. Respondent failed to return several messages left by Client C seeking an 
update on the matter.  After continued limited communication, Client C terminated 
the representation. Respondent has not returned Client C's file or any unused 
portion of the retainer. 
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Respondent failed to provide a written response to the complaint filed by Client C, 
and failed to appear or provide documents in response to a subpoena and notice to 
appear from ODC. 
Respondent admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client); Rule 1.4 (a lawyer shall keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information); Rule 1.16 (requirements upon termination of 
representation); and Rule 8.1 (a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter 
shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a 
disciplinary authority). 
Matter D 
The South Carolina Resolution of Fee Disputes Board issued a Certificate of Non-
Compliance against respondent in the amount of $5,000 with regard to the refund 
owed Client C. Respondent has not paid the amount owed. 
Respondent admits his conduct constitutes a ground for discipline under Rule 
7(a)(10), RLDE (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to willfully fail to 
comply with a final decision of the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board). 
Matter E 
Respondent has failed to fully reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection 
for funds it remitted to the attorney appointed to protect the interests of 
respondent's clients upon respondent's interim suspension, as ordered by this Court.  
Respondent has paid the Fund $100, which leaves an outstanding balance of 
$400.27. 
Respondent admits his conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under Rules 
7(a)(3) and (a)(5), RLDE (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to 
willfully violate a valid order of the Supreme Court or to engage in conduct 
tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal 
profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law). 
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Conclusion 

 
We hereby suspend respondent from the practice of law in this state for three years, 
retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.  Respondent shall, within thirty 
days of the date of this opinion, enter into a payment plan with the Commission on 
Lawyer Conduct to (1) pay the costs incurred by ODC and the Commission in 
investigating and prosecuting this matter ($196); (2) pay Client C, referenced 
above, $5,000; (3) pay the court reporter referenced above $711.63; and (4) 
reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection in the amount of $400.27.  
Respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School 
and Trust Account School. 
 
Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, 
SCACR. 
 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, HEARN AND FEW, JJ., concur. 
 
 
I would accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of law. 
 
KITTREDGE, J. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
RE:		 Amendments to Appendix A, Part IV, SCACR, Rules of the Board of 
Law Examiners 
Appellate Case No. 2014-001607 
ORDER 
The Board of Law Examiners requests the Court approve its proposed amendments 
to the Rules of the Board of Law Examiners found at Appendix A to Part IV of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  Pursuant to Article V, § 4 of the South 
Carolina Constitution, the Court approves the Board of Law Examiners' proposed 
amendments to the Rules of the Board of Law Examiners.  Appendix A to Part IV, 
SCACR, shall state as follows: 
 
RULES OF THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS 
(Promulgated Pursuant to Rule 402(k)(3) of the  
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR)) 
SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DISABLED APPLICANTS. 
1. Policy. It is the policy of the Board of Law Examiners (the Board) of 
the State of South Carolina to provide reasonable accommodations for 
disabled applicants including persons with learning disabilities and persons 
with health impairments.  The bar examination will be administered to all 
eligible applicants in a manner that does not discriminate against those 
applicants with disabilities. 
 
2.   Application Procedure. 
(a) Persons needing special accommodations on examinations should 
make a written request to the Board to obtain the necessary information, 
procedures and written forms.  Appropriate current documentation is 
required by the Board. 
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 (b) Upon written request to the Board, the manner in which the 
examination is administered to an applicant may be modified while 
maintaining the security and integrity of the examination. 
 
(c) An applicant must submit a written request for special testing 
accommodations on forms prescribed by the Board no later than November 
1st for the February examination and April 1st for the July examination. This 
filing deadline may be extended upon good cause as determined by the 
Chairman of the Board. 
 
(d) Applicants must submit a current medical verification prepared by 
a licensed professional qualified to diagnose such disability who can 
describe the nature and extent of the disability. 
 
(e) The Board may require the applicant to provide additional 
information in support of the applicant's request.  This information may 
include, but is not limited to, information concerning special 
accommodations provided during the applicant's law school education 
including certification from official representatives of the school where such 
accommodations were provided.  The Board may also require the applicant 
to undergo a physical/psychological examination to be conducted by a 
licensed professional designated by the Board verifying the nature and 
extent of the impairment.  The Board may also appoint an expert to analyze 
the documentation submitted by the applicant and to make a 
recommendation to the Board concerning appropriate accommodations. 
 
(f) In addition, an applicant seeking special testing accommodations 
due to a learning disability or attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder must 
provide appropriate documentation provided by a licensed professional 
qualified to diagnose such disability including, but not limited to, a licensed 
physician, learning disability specialist or psychologist.  Learning disability 
and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder evaluations must meet all 
requirements stated on the Board’s written forms and should be completed 
or updated within the past three (3) years.  An updated evaluation does not 
necessarily need to be a full, comprehensive diagnostic evaluation, but must 
provide information concerning relevant treatment, course of condition, 
current impairment, and rationale for current accommodation requests.  The 
previous comprehensive diagnostic evaluation must be submitted with the 
updated evaluation. It is the applicant’s responsibility to insure the Board is 
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 provided with a complete record fully demonstrating the existence and 
extent of impairment.   
  
3. General Standards and Procedures. 
 
(a) Depending on the nature and extent of an applicant's disability, the 
exam may be administered to the applicant in a separate room.  Applicants 
assigned to a separate testing room will be monitored by a proctor approved 
by the Secretary of the Board. 
 
(b) At the request of a blind or sight impaired applicant, the Board 
may provide the examination in braille or in large print; provided, the 
request is made no later than November 1st for the February exam and April 
1st for the July exam. 
 
(c) The Board may allow the applicant to use the services of a special 
assistant. This person may not provide substantive assistance to the 
applicant, but may read the Multistate Performance Test (MPT), Multistate 
Essay Examination (MEE) and/or the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) 
questions to the applicant. The special assistant may type or write the 
applicant's answers to the MPT and MEE questions and fill in the MBE 
answer sheet at the applicant's direction.  If the applicant chooses to use a 
special assistant, the applicant must provide background information 
regarding the special assistant to the Board.  The special assistant shall not 
have any legal related employment or education.  The Secretary of the Board 
must approve the special assistant. 
 
(d) The Board may allow a disabled applicant additional time to 
complete the MPT, MEE, and MBE portions of the examination.  The 
additional time on each section of the examination shall not exceed one and 
one half (1 1/2) times the normal time allotted for the section. In addition, 
longer rest and/or lunch breaks may be permitted; however, in no event shall 
the entire examination extend beyond two (2) additional days. 
 
(e) The Board shall determine the measures necessary to ensure that 
any special accommodations approved under this policy do not compromise 
the security or integrity of the examination or the integrity of the applicant's 
answers. 
 
49 

  
 
(f) The Board will notify the applicant of its decision on the request 
for special accommodations in writing at least thirty (30) days prior to the 
scheduled examination.  Provided, the Chairman of the Board may approve 
later notification when the filing deadline is extended pursuant to Paragraph 
(2)(c) of these Rules. 
 
(g) An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board may 
appeal to the Supreme Court within ten (10) days after service of the written 
decision of the Board.  This appeal is to be made by filing a motion with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court in compliance with Rule 240, SCACR. 
  
(h) The Secretary of the Board shall serve as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act coordinator for the Board and shall ensure that the 
provisions of this Rule are fully implemented. 
 
These amendments shall take effect ninety (90) days from the date of this order.  
See Rule 402(k)(3), SCACR.      
 s/ Costa M. Pleicones    C.J. 
 
      s/   Donald   W.   Beatty    J. 
 
      s/   John W. Kittredge   J. 
 
      s/   Kaye  G.   Hearn     J. 
 
      s/   John Cannon Few   J. 
      
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina  
September 14, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Miller Construction Company, LLC, 

Respondent/Appellant, 

 
v. 
 
PC Construction of Greenwood, Inc. and Safeco 
Insurance Company of America, 
Appellants/Respondents. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002749 
Appeal From Greenwood County 

Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5440 

Heard May 4, 2016 – Filed September 14, 2016 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED 
E. Wade Mullins III and Caitlin Creswick Heyward, both 
of Bruner Powell Wall & Mullins, LLC, of Columbia, for 
Appellants/Respondents. 
David J. Brousseau, of McIntosh Sherard Sullivan &
Brousseau, of Anderson, for Respondent/Appellant.   
MCDONALD, J.: In this breach of contract action seeking damages for failure to 
pay the balance due on a subcontract, Appellants/Respondents PC Construction of 
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Greenwood, Incorporated (PC) and Safeco Insurance Company of America 
(Safeco) (collectively, PC) appeal the circuit court's denial of its Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, motion to alter or amend, arguing the court erred in finding PC could not 
recover delay damages from Respondent/Appellant Miller Construction Company 
(Miller Construction).  PC further argues the circuit court failed to consider the 
overwhelming evidence that Miller Construction caused delays on the project.  On 
cross-appeal, Miller Construction argues the court erred in denying it prejudgment 
interest on its recovery for breach of contract.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, 
and remand the question of prejudgment interest to the circuit court.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case arises from a construction project known as the Lander University 
Recreation, Wellness, and Sports Complex Initiative Field Construction (the 
Project) in Greenwood County. The Project involved the site work and 
construction of soccer, baseball, softball, and tennis facilities at the Lander 
University (Lander) Jeff May Sports Complex (the Complex).  Lander put the 
Project out for bids and awarded it to general contractor PC pursuant to the South 
Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code.1  On December 15, 2009, PC contracted 
to complete the work for $7,005,310.  
PC subcontracted with Miller Construction2 on December 17, 2009, for certain 
construction services, including but not limited to site work, grading, paving, and 
installation of a storm sewer for the Project (the Subcontract).  Specifically, the 
Subcontract required Miller Construction to perform the work set forth in two 
specification provisions: (1) Section 31-1000 Site Clearing, Demo and Erosion 
Control (the Site Clearing and Demo Specification) and (2) Section 33-4100 Site 
Storm Drainage (the Storm Drain Specification).  The Site Clearing and Demo
Specification required Miller Construction to demolish and remove the existing 
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 11-35-10 to -5300 (2011 & Supp. 2015).   
2 Miller Construction holds a Group 4 General Contractor's License in the grading 
subclassification with the Contractor's Licensing Board of the South Carolina 
Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation.  A contractor's license in the 
grading subclassification allows a licensee to perform "the soil preparation and 
rehabilitation of streets, roads, highways, railroad beds, building sites, parking lots, 
and storm sewers."  S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-410(2)(d) (2011).
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storm drain system along with all other subgrade site improvements.  The Storm 
Drain Specification set forth the requirements for Miller Construction's installation 
of the storm drain pipes and manholes.  The original amount of the Subcontract 
was $492,424. 
During the course of the Project, Miller Construction submitted eighty-seven 
change orders to PC. Change Order #40 included a request to adjust the overall 
cost of the project as well as the schedule (Schedule) to include additional days due 
to delays caused by the discovery and removal process of nearly 10,000 tons of 
asbestos in early 2010. PC added additional days to the Schedule to address the 
asbestos issue.3  The parties later agreed the asbestos was more widespread than 
originally anticipated. 
Throughout the project, PC paid Miller Construction upon receipt of Miller 
Construction's pay applications. However, upon receipt of the final pay application 
in November 2011, PC withheld payment.  At that time, Lander had not yet made 
final payment to PC due to a dispute over how much Lander owed PC.  In spring 
2013, Lander and PC reached an agreement regarding final payment.4 
Nevertheless, PC continued to withhold final payment from Miller Construction, 
alleging that delay damages caused by Miller Construction exceeded the balance 
PC owed on the Subcontract. 
Miller Construction sued PC on May 25, 2012, seeking breach of contract damages 
for PC's failure to pay the balance due on the Subcontract.  Miller Construction 
also asserted a cause of action on a payment bond against Safeco.  On April 23, 
2013, PC filed an amended answer and counterclaim, seeking damages due to 
Miller Construction's alleged delay of the Project.  Prior to trial, PC further 
amended its answer, adding an affirmative defense that Miller Construction was 
not properly licensed and, therefore, was barred from pursuing a claim for breach 
of contract. In late 2013, the circuit court denied the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment; a nonjury trial was held in November 2013.  
Miller Construction's vice president, Michael Miller, testified that he understood 
and agreed to the terms of the Subcontract; he further acknowledged his 
understanding that timely completion of the Project was important and required 
3 PC does not claim any damages against Miller Construction for this delay.   
4 Lander did not assess any damages for delays against PC.  
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under the Subcontract.  He conceded that the Subcontract required Miller 
Construction to comply with the Schedule and the Schedule durations for Miller 
Construction's scope of work and that Miller Construction was required to provide 
the manpower and equipment necessary to meet the Schedule.  Miller admitted the 
Subcontract required Miller Construction to submit a request for a change order if 
changed conditions required an increase in price or adjustment to the Schedule.  
Miller testified that by signing the Subcontract he agreed Miller Construction 
would be liable to PC for any damages that PC could show were a result of Miller 
Construction's failure to comply with any portion of the Schedule.  He admitted 
that Miller Construction failed to notify PC at any time—other than in Change 
Order #40—that it was seeking additional time through a request for a change 
order under the terms of the Subcontract.   
PC's project manager, Gary Piontek (the Project Manager), testified that after the 
asbestos issue was resolved, Miller Construction failed to maintain the Schedule, 
and PC encountered consistent and continuous problems with Miller Construction's 
failure to timely perform its work.  The Project Manager and PC's site personnel 
communicated those concerns to Miller Construction throughout the Project at 
weekly meetings and by email.  However, email correspondence from the Project 
Manager to Mike Miller supported Miller's contention that the delays were caused 
not by Miller Construction, but by PC's inability to coordinate its various 
subcontractors and by other issues not within Miller Construction's control. 
PC's president, Randy Piontek, testified he got involved in an effort to get Miller 
Construction to comply with the Schedule.  Randy Piontek admitted PC owed 
Miller Construction $51,270.08 of the claimed $53,695.08; however, PC refused 
payment due to alleged delay damages exceeding that figure.
The Project Manager presented a detailed accounting of the delays allegedly 
caused by Miller Construction and the impact of those delays on PC's ability to 
complete the Project.  In support of those claims, the Project Manager introduced 
PC's Activity Duration Schedule Analysis, which included a comparison of the 
original activity durations for each task with the actual time it took Miller 
Construction to complete them. PC claimed 145 days in total delays and arrived at 
its delay damage claim of $137,035.15 by multiplying the 145 days by its daily 
rate of $945.07. PC then presented John Bahr, president of a construction 
consulting firm, as its expert witness on scheduling, construction management, and 
contract administration services.  Bahr testified he was familiar with the Project 
because his company had been retained to assist in establishing the Schedule.  Bahr 
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opined that Miller Construction failed to comply with its contractual obligations to 
perform and complete its activities in accordance with the Schedule and that the 
delay calculation of 145 days was reasonable.  Moreover, Bahr testified as to the 
methodology used to calculate the daily rate, explaining that Miller Construction's 
lack of timely performance impacted PC's completion of the work and caused 
delay damages, including increased overhead, to PC.  
On July 8, 2014, the circuit court issued a final order and judgment denying PC's
claim for delay damages, finding PC owed Miller Construction $51,270.08, and 
ordering immediate payment by Safeco on the bond.  The court declined to award 
Miller Construction prejudgment interest.  Miller Construction and PC filed timely 
Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions to alter or amend, which the circuit court denied.  
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
PC raises four issues on appeal: 
I.		 Did the circuit court err in finding PC could not recover damages against 

Miller Construction pursuant to the Subcontract because Lander never 

assessed any liquidated damages against PC? 

II.		 Did the circuit court err in concluding Miller Construction did not cause any 
delays on the Project? 
III.		 Did the circuit court err in finding Miller Construction was properly licensed 
to perform the subcontract work and, thus, permitted to bring an action 
pursuant to section 40-11-370(C) of the South Carolina Code (2011)? 
IV.		 Did the circuit court err in determining Miller Construction was entitled to 
recover on the payment bond and in ordering immediate payment from the 
bond to Miller Construction?
Miller Construction raises one issue on cross-appeal: 
I.		 Did the circuit court err in failing to award Miller Construction prejudgment 
interest when the principle balance owed is capable of being calculated as a 
sum certain? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"An action to construe a contract is an action at law reviewable under an 'any 
evidence' standard."  Pruitt v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting 
Ass'n, 343 S.C. 335, 339, 540 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2001).  "In an action at law tried 
without a jury, an appellate court's scope of review extends merely to the 
correction of errors of law." Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc., 381 S.C. 597, 599–600, 675 
S.E.2d 414, 415 (2009). "The Court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless 
they are found to be without evidence that reasonably supports those findings."  Id. 
at 600, 675 S.E.2d at 415. "The rule is the same whether the judge's findings are 
made with or without, a reference."  Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 
S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976).  "The judge's findings are equivalent to a 
jury's findings in a law action."  Id. 
PC'S ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Damages 
PC argues the circuit court erred in finding it could not recover damages against 
Miller Construction under the Subcontract because Lander never assessed any 
liquidated damages against PC.  We disagree. 
"The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give legal effect to 
the parties' intentions as determined by the contract language."  Whitlock v. Stewart 
Title Guar. Co., 399 S.C. 610, 614, 732 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2012).  "Where the 
contract's language is clear and unambiguous, the language alone determines the 
contract's force and effect."  Id. at 615, 732 S.E.2d 628. "A contract is ambiguous 
only when it may fairly and reasonably be understood in more ways than one."  
Jordan v. Sec. Grp., Inc., 311 S.C. 227, 230, 428 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1993).  "It is a 
question of law for the court whether the language of a contract is ambiguous." 
S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 
299, 302–03 (2001).
PC argues the circuit court erred in the following finding:
Pursuant to the subcontract, PC cannot recover any type 
of liquidated damages against Miller as PC was never 
assessed with liquidated damages or damages for delay 
from [O]wner. As such, taking the evidence in a light 
most favorable to PC, it is unable to sustain a cause of 
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action for breach of contract against Miller for delay 
damages.  Miller's motion for involuntary non-
suit/directed verdict as to this cause of action is hereby 
granted. 
PC further argues that the terms of the Subcontract are clear and unambiguous with 
respect to Miller Construction's obligations to timely perform its scope of work and 
contends the Subcontract repeatedly references that "time is of the essence" 
regarding performance and completion.  Conversely, Miller Construction argues 
the circuit court properly denied PC's counterclaim for delay damages when 
Lander did not assess any damages against PC for delays and PC agreed to accept 
additional compensation from Lander due to delays not caused by PC or its 
subcontractors. 
Miller Construction submits that Article 3 of the Subcontract is controlling as to 
payment by PC to Miller Construction during the progress of the Project and with 
respect to final payment. Article 3 provides:
ARTICLE 3: SUBCONTRACT PRICE AND 
PAYMENT 
. . . 
e. CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT.  Within ten (10) 
days after receipt by [PC] from [Lander] of monies in 
payment of Subcontractor's application for payment, 
receipt of such payment from [Lander] being an express 
condition precedent to [PC]'s obligation to pay 
Subcontractor, [PC] shall pay the same over to 
Subcontractor less retainage.  Notwithstanding any 
contrary provision elsewhere in this Subcontract, [PC] 
may delay payment of all or any portion of 
Subcontractor's application for payment in order to 
reasonably determine that Subcontractor's Work for 
which payment is requested has been properly 
performed and is in place, that sufficient funds remain 
available to complete Subcontractor's Work, that 
Subcontractor's Work will be completed as required 
by the Job Schedule, that Subcontractor's application for 
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 payment and accompanying affidavits and waivers are 
true and correct in fact, and that all other requirements of 
this Subcontract have been satisfied relative to 
Subcontractor's Work for which payment is sought.  
When such determinations have been made to [PC]'s 
satisfaction, [PC] will make payment in accordance 
with Subcontractor's application as provided for in 
this Subcontract.  No such determination or payment 
shall relieve Subcontractor from its obligations under this 
subcontract, nor stop [PC] from subsequently asserting 
Subcontractor's failure to satisfy said obligations. 
  . . . 
g. FINAL PAYMENT 
. . . 
iii.      CONDITIONS OF FINAL PAYMENT.  Final 
payment of the balance of the Subcontract Price due shall 
be made to Subcontractor: 
1. when appropriate certification and final approval 
thereof have been received as provided in the Contract 
Documents; and 
 
2. after receipt by [PC] of final payment from 
[Lander], such receipt being an express condition 
precedent to [PC]'s obligation to make final payment to 
the Subcontractor. Subcontractor's acceptance of final 
payment shall constitute a waiver by Subcontractor of all 
claims relating to Subcontractor's Work except such 
claims as have been previously identified and made in 
writing and fully and properly preserved and pursued 
pursuant to the terms of this Subcontract. 
 
(emphasis added). 
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 PC and Miller Construction agree that Article 6 is relevant as to delays and claims 
relating to Lander. 
ARTICLE 6: CHANGES, FIELD ORDERS, CLAIMS, 
AND DELAYS 
a. CHANGES. Without nullifying this Subcontract 
or any bond given pursuant to this Subcontract, [PC] 
may, in writing, direct the Subcontractor to make 
changes to the Subcontractor's Work, which changes are 
within the scope of this Subcontract.  Within ten (10) 
days of [PC]'s directive or if the Contract Documents 
require notice to be given by [PC] to [Lander] in less than 
ten days, Subcontractor shall comply with the notice 
requirements of the Contract Documents by giving notice 
and a written proposal to [PC] within such time as to 
enable [PC] to give notice to [Lander] or to comply with 
any other notice requirements of the Contract 
Documents.  FAILURE OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR 
TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN PROPOSAL WITHIN THE 
TIME PROVIDED HEREIN, OR TO PROVIDE A 
WRITTEN NOTICE WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED 
HEREIN, SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE 
SUBCONTRACTOR'S RIGHT TO AN ADJUSTMENT 
OF THE SUBCONTRACT PRICE OR JOB 
SCHEDULE OR, WHERE A CREDIT IS INVOLVED, 
SUBCONTRACTOR ACCEPTS THE AMOUNT 
DETERMINED BY [LANDER], ARCHITECT 
AND/OR [PC].  Any adjustments to the Subcontract 
Price or Job Schedule, if any, shall be set forth in a 
written Subcontract Change Order. . . .  THERE WILL 
BE NO ADJUSTMENT TO THE SUBCONTRACT 
PRICE OR JOB SCHEDULE WHICH ARE NOT 
ORDERED IN WRITING BY [PC] AND SIGNED BY 
THE PROJECT MANAGER, Gary Piontek. . . . 
  . . . 
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 d. CLAIMS RELATING TO [LANDER]. . . . 
Subcontractor shall only be entitled to an adjustment to 
the Subcontract Price or Job Schedule, for performing 
and completing that portion of Subcontractor's Work 
associated with any claim for which [Lander] is or may 
be liable, upon the same terms and conditions as any 
extension of time or additional compensation is allowable 
to [PC] under the Contract Documents, and only to the 
extent actually allowed and paid to [PC] by [Lander], 
receipt of payment from [Lander] being an express 
condition precedent to [PC]'s obligation to pay 
Subcontractor.  Any decision of [Lander] or Architect 
with respect to such claims which, under the terms of 
the Contract Documents, is binding on [PC], and any 
decision in arbitration or litigation between [Lander] 
and [PC] which becomes final and binding on [PC] 
shall likewise be final and binding on Subcontractor.  
 
. . . 
  
e. DELAY. If the progress of Subcontractor's Work 
is substantially delayed without the fault or responsibility 
of Subcontractor, then the Job Schedule shall be adjusted 
accordingly, but only to the extent an extension of time is 
obtained by [PC] from [Lander] under the terms of the 
Contract Documents; provided that Subcontractor must 
give written notice of delay to [PC] within such time as 
to enable [PC] to give [Lander] any notices required by 
the Contract Documents, but in any event, no later than 
five (5) days after the occurrence of the event claimed to 
be a substantial delay, otherwise the right to such an 
adjustment to the Job Schedule is waived. . . .  If the 
Contract Documents provide for liquidated or other 
damages for delay and such damages are so assessed 
against [PC], then [PC] may assess same against 
Subcontractor in proportion to Subcontractor's share 
of the responsibility for such delay as determined by 
[PC].  Subcontractor shall also be liable for all 
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 additional damages [PC] may incur as a result of 
Subcontractor's failure to complete the 
Subcontractor's Work or any portion thereof in 
accordance with the Job Schedule, including direct 
costs, liquidated damages and/or [PC's] extended 
overhead. 
 
(emphasis added). 
PC correctly contends on appeal that the Subcontract specifically allows PC to 
assess delay damages, including damages for extended overhead and liquidated 
damages, against Miller Construction.  However, the Subcontract classifies such 
damages as "additional damages." Further, the record reflects that after 
completion of the Project, PC and Lander were involved in a dispute regarding 
final payment. PC agreed to and accepted an additional payment from Lander of 
approximately $120,000 for "extended general conditions" or "overhead" due to 
roughly 120 days of delays not caused by PC or its subcontractors.  Pursuant to the 
terms of the Subcontract, "[a]ny decision of [Lander] or Architect with respect to 
such claims which, under the terms of the Contract Documents, is binding on [PC], 
and any decision in arbitration or litigation between [Lander] and [PC] which 
becomes final and binding on [PC] shall likewise be final and binding on 
Subcontractor."  Moreover, Randy Piontek acknowledged at trial that Lander never 
assessed any damages against PC due to delays.  The following exchange occurred:   
Q: Do you have any documents, whatsoever, that say 
that liquidated damages were assessed by Lander 
University or Lander Foundation against [PC]? 
A: There was a letter sent by Lander that indicated that 
they expected liquidated damages to be assessed against 
the first phase of the project.  As a part of our settlement, 
the liquidated damages were included. 
Q: My question though, sir, was[,] were they ever 
actually assessed? You stated that you expected them to 
be or Lander expected them to be assessed.  My question 
was, were they actually ever assessed? 
A: I guess, technically no. 
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Q: And under your contract, you can only assess 
liquidated damages against Miller if they're assessed by 
Lander, correct? 
A: Correct. 
In light of Randy Piontek's testimony and the contract language itself, and under 
our "any evidence" standard of review, we find the circuit court properly 
determined that PC could not recover damages against Miller Construction 
pursuant to the terms of the Subcontract.  See Pruitt, 343 S.C. at 339, 540 S.E.2d at 
845 ("An action to construe a contract is an action at law reviewable under an 'any 
evidence' standard."); Temple, 381 S.C. at 599–600, 675 S.E.2d at 415 ("The Court 
will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are found to be without 
evidence that reasonably supports those findings."). Although the Subcontract 
specifically allowed PC to join Miller Construction as a party to any action against 
Lander, PC elected not to do so and then agreed to and accepted final payment 
from Lander without any input from Miller Construction.  Significantly, the circuit 
court noted it "would have additionally found that PC did not meet its burden of 
proof on this [the delay] issue.  The evidence was clear that Miller did not cause 
any delays on this project." Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court findings as to 
this issue. 
II. Delays 
PC argues the circuit court erred in concluding Miller Construction did not cause 
any delays on the project. We disagree. 
Throughout the Project, PC paid Miller Construction upon its applications for 
payment. In January 2011, PC's Project Manager emailed Michael Miller 
acknowledging Miller Construction was on-site when allegedly no other 
contractors were. On January 27, 2011, the Project Manager communicated a 
work request and concluded his email with the comment, "Miller has been a great
sub, [w]hich I will gladly recommend."  In April 2011, the Project Manager again 
emailed Michael Miller, this time to confirm that Miller Construction was doing 
what was necessary to keep the Project on track.  PC also confirmed that Lander 
had not charged it for liquidated damages due to any alleged delays.  In other 
correspondence, the Project Manager communicated his timeliness concerns, but it 
was unclear whether these delays were the fault of Miller Construction or the 
general contractor's inability to coordinate the work of its various subcontractors in 
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 light of Project setbacks caused by heavy rains and other issues which were not the 
fault of Miller Construction. Moreover, Bradley Grogan, Assistant Athletic 
Director for the Complex, and Frank Sells, II, ground superintendent at Lander, 
both testified that Miller Construction kept the Project running, as best it could, in 
accordance with the job schedule.  At the completion of the Project in November 
2011, PC admitted it owed Miller Construction approximately $15,000 as well as 
its retainage of approximately $51,000.  PC again made no mention of any delays 
or damages at the time of Miller's final payment application.   
Our review of the record reveals Miller Construction presented evidence 
establishing it did not cause the delays on the Project.  Therefore, under our 
deferential "any evidence" standard of review, we hold there is evidence 
reasonably supporting the circuit court's findings.  See Pruitt, 343 S.C. at 339, 540 
S.E.2d at 845 ("An action to construe a contract is an action at law reviewable 
under an 'any evidence' standard."); Temple, 381 S.C. at 599–600, 675 S.E.2d at 
415 ("The Court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are found to 
be without evidence that reasonably supports those findings.").  Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court's findings as to the Project delays. 
III. Licensing 
PC next contends that the circuit court erred in finding Miller Construction was 
properly licensed to perform the work pursuant to the Subcontract and, thus, 
section 40-11-370(C) of the South Carolina Code barred Miller Construction's 
action. We disagree. 
Pursuant to section 40-11-370(C), "An entity which does not have a valid license 
as required by this chapter may not bring an action either at law or in equity to 
enforce the provisions of a contract."  Section 40-11-410(2) contains a "General 
Contractors–Highway" licensing classification which includes, in relevant part, the 
following subclassifications: 
(d) "Grading" which includes the soil preparation and 
rehabilitation of streets, roads, highways, railroad beds, 
building sites, parking lots, and storm sewers. This 
subclassification also includes work under the 
subclassification of Highway Incidental. 
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(e) "Highway Incidental" which includes highway work 
for grooving, milling, rehabilitating, and installing 
guardrails, gutters, highway signs, pavement marking, 
and painting. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-410(2)(d)–(e) (2011) (emphasis added).   
PC argues that pursuant to section 40-11-410(3)(c), Miller was required to hold a 
"General Contractors–Public Utility" license—rather than a "General Contractors– 
Highway" license—which includes the subclassification "Water and Sewer Lines" 
to perform work on the Project's storm sewer system.5    
At the outset of our analysis, we note—as the circuit court did—that "[i]t is 
unlawful for an owner, a construction manager, a [general] contractor, or another 
entity with contracting or hiring authority on a construction project to divide work 
into portions so as to avoid the financial or other requirements of this chapter as it 
relates to license classifications or subclassifications or license groups, or both."  
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-300(A) (2011) (emphasis added).  Citing to section § 40-
11-270(E) (2011), the circuit court also recognized that "[t]he licensee is fully 
responsible for any violations of this chapter resulting from the actions of 
unlicensed subcontractors performing work for the licensee."   
The circuit court explained that "if PC hired unlicensed subcontractors to perform 
work on this project[,] it would be in violation of the law.  The purpose of 
protecting the public interest by denying enforceability does not exist when dealing 
with claims between contractors."  Teseniar v. Prof'l Plastering & Stucco, Inc., 407 
S.C. 83, 97, 754 S.E.2d 267, 274 (Ct. App. 2014); see also Kennoy v. Graves, 300 
5 The "Water and Sewer Lines" subclassification includes "construction work on 
water mains, water service lines, water storage tanks, sewer mains, sewer lines, lift 
stations, pumping stations and appurtenances to water storage tanks, lift stations, 
pumping stations, pavement patching, backfill, and erosion control as a part of 
construction, and . . . includes connection at the building of all lines to the 
appropriate lines contained in commercial structures, installation and repair of a 
project involving manholes, the laying of pipe for storm drains and sewer 
mains, all necessary connections, and excavation and backfilling, and concrete 
work incidental thereto." S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-410(3)(c) (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
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 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) ("The statute involved, and similar ones, are 
designed to protect the public from being imposed upon by persons not qualified to 
render a professional service.  The reason for the rule denying enforceability does 
not exist when persons engaged in the same business or profession are dealing at 
arm['s] length with each other.  In the case before us, appellant was in a position to 
know, and did know, the qualifications of appellee.  No reliance was placed upon 
the existence of a license, as presumptively would be the case if appellee was 
dealing with the general public."). Moreover, during the course of the Project, 
there was no claim that Miller Construction was not licensed to perform this work, 
and there is no evidence that any permitting agency ever attempted to stop work on 
the Project due to licensing issues.  
Although Defendants' Exhibit 1 illustrates that the Project involved the installation 
of manholes and the laying of pipe for storm drains, PC's Project Manager testified 
that a new storm sewer system was installed and joined to an existing storm sewer 
system.  Additionally, PC's expert testified Miller Construction's scope of work did 
not involve rehabilitation of the storm sewer system as contemplated in the grading 
classification.   
However, the legislature included the term "rehabilitation" within the grading 
subclassification without any language excluding installation and demolition of 
storm sewer lines.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-11-410(2)(d) (2011).  "Questions of 
statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to decide without 
any deference to the court below."  CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 
S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011).  "The cardinal rule of statutory 
construction is a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 
legislature." State v. Elwell, 403 S.C. 606, 612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2013). 
"What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of 
the legislative intent or will." Id.  "Where the statute's language is plain and 
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory 
interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another 
meaning." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).  
"Under this rule, a statute restricting the common law will 'not be extended beyond 
the clear intent of the legislature.'"  Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 
536, 725 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2012) (quoting Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 
S.C. 626, 628, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857 (2000)).  "Statutes subject to this rule include 
those which 'limit a claimant's right to bring suit.'"  Id. (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 
535). 
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"When confronted with an undefined term, the court must interpret it in accordance 
with its usual and customary meaning."  Hughes v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 
386 S.C. 641, 646, 689 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ct. App. 2010).  "However, this court will 
consider the language of the particular clause in which the term appears and also 
its meaning in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute."  Id.; see also 
Hinton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 357 S.C. 327, 332–33, 592 
S.E.2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Terms must be construed in context and their 
meaning determined by looking at the other terms used in the statute.").  
The term "rehabilitation" is not defined in the statute.  Therefore, we must look to 
the common definition of "rehabilitate," which is "to bring (someone or something) 
back to a good condition."  Rehabilitate, MERRIAM–WEBSTER.COM, http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/rehabilitate (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).  Rehabilitate is 
also defined as "to put back in good condition; reestablish on a firm, sound basis."  
Rehabilitate, YOURDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.yourdictionary.com/rehabilitate 
#websters (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
Miller testified that Miller Construction demolished the existing storm drainage 
system that was previously a parking lot.  "This site was one time a shopping 
center, so we removed it.  We went back in, installed new storm drainage[, which 
w]e tied to some of the existing boxes that [were] there[,] and also ran new piping 
from there to some of existing boxes."  Therefore, the evidence supports the circuit 
court's finding that "the legislature intended to keep such a broad term like 
rehabilitation within the context of the statute."  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit 
court as to this issue. 
IV. Payment Bond 
PC argues the circuit court erred in determining Miller Construction was entitled to 
recover on its claim under the payment bond and in ordering immediate payment to 
Miller Construction.  We find this issue is not preserved for our review.   
PC contends Miller Construction erroneously argued that its suit on the payment 
bond was brought pursuant to section 29-5-440 of the South Carolina Code6 and 
6  "Every person who has furnished labor, material, or rental equipment to a 
bonded contractor or its subcontractors in the prosecution of work provided for in 
any contract for construction, and who has not been paid in full therefor before the 
expiration of a period of ninety days after the day on which the last of the labor 
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that the circuit court erroneously referenced the matter as brought pursuant to 
section 29-5-440. PC further argues that because the bond was issued for a public 
project and the bid process occurred in accordance with the South Carolina 
Procurement Code, the action on the bond could only be brought pursuant to 
section 11-35-3030.7  Our review of the record reveals that PC raised this issue for 
the first time in its Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend.  Accordingly, we 
find this issue is not preserved for appellate review.  See Patterson v. Reid, 318 
S.C. 183, 185, 456 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A party cannot for the first 
time raise an issue by way of a Rule 59(e) motion which could have been raised at 
trial.").
MILLER CONSTRUCTION'S ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
I. Prejudgment Interest 
Miller Construction argues the circuit court erred in failing to award prejudgment 
interest on its damages claim because the principle balance owed is capable of 
being calculated as a sum certain. We agree. 
"The law permits the award of prejudgment interest when a monetary obligation is 
a sum certain, or is capable of being reduced to certainty, accruing from the time 
was done or performed by him or material or rental equipment was furnished or 
supplied by him for which such claim is made, shall have the right to sue on the 
payment bond for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at the time of the 
institution of such suit and to prosecute such action to final execution and 
judgment for the sum or sums justly due him. . . .  This section shall apply to any 
payment bond, whether statutory, public, common law, or private in nature, that is 
issued in connection with a construction project or other improvements to real 
property within South Carolina where such payment bonds are not otherwise 
required or governed by any other section of the South Carolina Code of Laws."  
S.C. Code § 29-5-440 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
7 In any event, section 11-35-3030 provides in pertinent part that "written notice to 
the bonded contractor must generally conform to the requirements of Section 29-5-
20(B) . . . ." S.C. Code § 11-35-3030 (2)(c) (Supp. 2015).  Section 29-5-20(B) sets 
forth the required notice content for the lien of a laborer, mechanic, subcontractor, 
or materialman, as well as the aggregate limits on such.  S.C. Code § 29-5-20 (B) 
(2007).
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payment may be demanded either by the agreement of the parties or the operation 
of law." Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 435, 673 
S.E.2d 448, 457 (2009); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(A) (Supp. 2015) ("In 
all cases of accounts stated and in all cases wherein any sum or sums of money 
shall be ascertained and, being due, shall draw interest according to law, the legal 
interest shall be at the rate of eight and three-fourths percent per annum."). 
"Generally, prejudgment interest may not be recovered on an unliquidated claim in 
the absence of agreement or statute." Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC, 381 S.C. 
at 435, 673 S.E.2d at 457. "The fact that the amount due is disputed does not 
render the claim unliquidated for purposes of awarding prejudgment interest."   Id.
"Rather, the proper test is 'whether or not the measure of recovery, not necessarily 
the amount of damages, is fixed by conditions existing at the time the claim 
arose.'" Id. (quoting Butler Contracting, Inc. v. Court Street, LLC, 369 S.C. 121, 
133, 631 S.E.2d 252, 259 (2006)). 
"The right of a party to prejudgment interest is not affected by rights of discount or 
offset claimed by the opposing party.  It is the character of the claim and not the 
defense to it that determines whether prejudgment interest is allowable."  Butler 
Contracting, Inc., 369 S.C. at 133–34, 631 S.E.2d at 259.  "A judgment debtor is
required to pay interest on his debt as compensation for his continued retention and 
use of the creditor's money beyond the date payment was due."  Id. at 134, 631 
S.E.2d at 259. 
In S. Welding Works, Inc. v. K & S Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 158, 332 S.E.2d 102 (Ct. 
App. 1985), this court found the circuit court properly disallowed prejudgment 
interest in an action on an account stated, reasoning:
Although Southern pleaded an account stated, it 
apparently failed to prove the elements of an account 
stated at trial. The essential elements of an account 
stated are (1) that the account is actually stated; and (2) 
that the parties either expressly or impliedly agreed that it 
is a true statement and is due to be paid then or at some 
other specified time. Southern proved the account was 
actually stated. However, in its answer K & S 
specifically denied the parties ever agreed it was a true 
account. Consequently, the burden was on Southern to 
prove agreement to the account as stated.  In the record 
before us there is no evidence that K & S expressly or 
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impliedly agreed there was at any specified time due to 
Southern the sum of money specified in the account. 
Likewise, we find no evidence that the parties agreed to a 
contract price for the repairs before they were performed. 
Accordingly, prejudgment interest was properly 
disallowed. 
Id. at 164–65, 332 S.E.2d at 106 (citation omitted).   
Here, Miller Construction sought damages for breach of contract for failure to pay 
the balance due on the Subcontract, alleging it is owed the principle balance of 
$53,695.08 and affirmatively sought prejudgment interest.  At trial, Randy Piontek 
admitted the balance on the contract with Miller Construction was $51,270.08 of 
the $53,695.08 claimed under the contract, thus, offsetting PC's alleged delay 
damages.  Although Miller Construction initially sought prejudgment interest of 
$7,586.09, it presented a revised calculation of $10,691.35 in its Rule 59(e), 
SCRCP, motion to alter or amend.  Based on our review of the record, we find 
Miller Construction is entitled to prejudgment interest as it proved the essential 
elements of an account stated.    
However, we agree with PC that there are insufficient findings in the record on 
appeal to determine at what point a sum certain claim accrued. Miller 
Construction asserts prejudgment interest began to accrue on March 29, 2012.  In 
its final order and judgment, the circuit court found that final payment from Lander 
was an express condition to PC's obligation to issue final payment to Miller 
Construction, which occurred in spring 2013. As such, there could not have been a 
final sum certain until spring 2013, approximately one year after the March 29, 
2012 date set forth by Miller Construction.  Thus, we remand this matter to the 
circuit court to determine when the sum certain accrued under the contract and to 
assess the appropriate prejudgment interest.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the following findings: PC could not 
recover delay damages against Miller Construction because Lander never assessed 
liquidated damages against PC; PC did not meet its burden of proof on the delay 
issue; and Miller Construction was properly licensed and able to seek payment.  
PC's additional payment bond argument is not preserved for appellate review.  We 
reverse the circuit court's decision declining to award prejudgment interest to 
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Miller Construction and remand this matter for the circuit court to determine when 
the sum certain accrued and to assess prejudgment interest.  
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.  
LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS, J., concur. 
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